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DAMAGES: PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN
FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT ACTIONS: ANNUAL EVOLUTION IN
RESPONSE TO KOLSTAD
INTRODUCTION
Courts had no authority to award punitive damages in federal em-
ployment actions' until passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.2 The
Civil Rights Act of 1991 states that courts may award punitive damages
if the defendant engaged in "a discriminatory practice or discriminatory
practices with malice or reckless indifference to the federally protected
rights of an aggrieved individual."3 Since passage of the act, the circuits
have been in conflict over what constitutes the "malice or reckless indif-
ference ' 4 required to allow punitive damages Compensatory and puni-
tive damages can only be recovered under Title VII and Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA") in disparate treatment cases,6 which requires
showing of employer intent to discriminate. Some circuits hold that the
plaintiff must show evidence of the employer's egregious conduct re-
garding the plaintiff's legal rights Others circuits hold that nothing ad-
ditional is required to award punitive damages once the employer has
lost a disparate treatment case.8 The Tenth Circuit applies this standard.
Vicarious liability becomes an issue, as well, because if the employee is
suing the employer, rather than the discriminating manager, for instance,
he may have to show the employer's state of mind. Collecting punitive
damages is therefore more difficult. Part One of this survey will discuss
the standard applied in the Tenth Circuit for awarding punitive damages
in federal employment actions (Title VII, ADA, and section 1981) and
how this standard may change as a result of the recent Supreme Court
1. This survey specifically addresses federal employment actions under § 1981, Title
VII, and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) only. While there are many other
avenues of action in federal employment law, these three provisions share similar remedial
interpretation, discussed below.
2. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in
various sections of U.S.C.).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(b)(1).
4. Id.
5. See Michael Wise, Court Disregards Legislative History of the Civil Rights Act
and of 1991 and Bucks Current Trends Regarding Punitive Damages, 23 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 643, 645 (1998); Judith Johnson, A Uniform Standard for Exemplary Damages in
Employment Discrimination Cases, 33 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 41, 60-61 (1999).
6. See Johnson, supra note 5, at 60.
7. See, e.g., Merriweather v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 103 F.3d 576, 581 (7th Cir.
1996); Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 110 F.3d 210, 219-20 (2d Cir. 1997); Ngo v. Reno Hilton
Resort Corp., 140 F. 3d 1299, 1302 (9th Cir. 1998).
8. See, e.g., Dudley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 166 F. 3d 1317 (11th Cir. 1999);
Harris v. L&L Wings, Inc., 132 F. 3d 978 (4th Cir. 1997).
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decision in Kolstad v. American Dental Association.9 Part Two of this
survey will discuss vicarious liability with respect to punitive damage
awards. The standard established by Kolstad and used by the Tenth Cir-
cuit makes it extremely difficult for plaintiffs to recover punitive dam-
ages in federal employment actions, contrary to congressional intent.
I. PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARDS
A. Background
1. Section 1981 and Title VII
Prior to passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, plaintiffs could col-
lect punitive damages under section 1981, but not Title VII or ADA
claims. Section 1981 prohibits discrimination based on race, color, and
national origin.'0 Section 1981 only applies in cases of intentional dis-
crimination, or disparate treatment." Prior to the Civil Rights Act of
1991, a plaintiff could collect equitable, compensatory and punitive
damages from section 1981. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
prevents an employer from hiring, firing, or otherwise discriminating
with regard to any term or condition of employment because of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. 2 Until recently, remedies under
Title VII were only equitable. 3 If a plaintiff wants to recover damages
for race, color, or national origin discrimination, he can sue under Title
VII and section 1981. After the Civil Rights Act of 1991, a plaintiff can
now collect damages in situations not previously possible under section
198 1.4 A plaintiff suing for sex or religious discrimination may now sue
using Title VII and collect punitive damages.
2. Americans with Disabilities Act
The ADA is modeled after Title VII and contains the same types of
prohibition against discrimination in the workplace.' 5 Since the Civil
9. 119 S.Ct. 2118 (1999). The Kolstad decision was completed near the end of the period of
this survey. Therefore, this survey will contain a discussion of the standard applied prior to and after
the decision.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994). Section 1981 provides that "All persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to
make and enforce contracts, to sue, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property that is to be enjoyed by
white citizens..." 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
11. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975).
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000(e)(17) (1994).
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(5)(g) (1988). Remedies also included backpay and
reinstatement.
14. Title VII provides relief for sex and religious discrimination in addition to race,
color, and national origin. 42 U.S.C § 1981(a)(b)(1).
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 12, 112(a) (1994). This statutory provision states that "no
covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of
the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
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Rights Act of 1991, Title VII and the ADA have a similar framework for
damages.' 6 The act only provides for punitive damages in cases of dispa-
rate treatment, which requires the showing of intent.'7 Since section 1981
and Title VII are often considered together, they have shared the same
remedial interpretation. Because the ADA is modeled after Title VII, it is
subject to the same interpretation as Title VII. Therefore, these three
laws'" now share the same standard for punitive damage awards.
3. Supreme Court Treatment
Prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Supreme Court articulated
the proper standard for punitive damages under section 1981 to be
"reckless or callous disregard for the plaintiffs rights, as intentional
violations of federal law."' 9 In 1983 in Smith v. Wade,2° the Court de-
clined to establish a higher requirement for punitive damage awards than
compensatory awards.2' The language used by the Smith court is virtually
identical to the "reckless indifference" language used in the Civil Rights
Act of 1991.22 Since this recent Supreme Court interpretation of the stan-
dard for punitive damages, the courts have struggled when deciding
when punitive damages may be awarded. This may be because the court
must distinguish between the intentional discrimination needed for li-
ability and the reckless indifference to the plaintiffs rights needed for
punitive damages. The defendant meets the requirement for punitive
damages when he is reckless, which is insufficient for liability. However,
without finding the defendant guilty of discrimination, there can be no
question of punitive damages. As a result, courts have varied in applica-
tion of the Smith v. Wade standard. Some courts made the standard for
punitive damages higher than "reckless indifference to the plaintiffs
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12, 112(a).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(a)(2).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(a)(2). Compensatory and punitive damages are allowed "in
an action brought by complaining parties under the powers, remedies, and procedures set
forth in . . . . the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . . against a respondent who engaged in
unlawful intentional discrimination (not an employment practice that is unlawful because
of its disparate impact)..." Id. (emphasis added).
18. These three provisions are § 1981, Title VII, and the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA).
19. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 51 (1983). The claim in Smith is based on a § 1983
claim, but courts have held the standard applied is applicable to § 1981. See Stallworth v.
Shuler, 777 F. 2d 1431, 1435 (11 th Cir. 1985); Block v. R.H. Macy & Co. 712 F.2d 1241,
1246 (8th Cir. 1983).
20. 461 U.S. 30 (1983).
21. See Smith, 461 U.S. at 53.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(b)(1).
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rights"23 in application. Other courts required evidence of some addition-
ally aggravating employer behavior.24
4. Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n
The confusion has most recently caught the eye of the Supreme Court
and resulted in the Court recently deciding Kolstad v. American Dental
Ass'n.25 In Kolstad, the plaintiff, Carole Kolstad applied for a promotion
within American Dental.26 Despite having worked with the previous su-
pervisor and received good performance ratings, a male coworker was
given the position. 7 Kolstad brought action alleging intentional discrimi-
nation under Title VII.2s She believed that "the entire selection process
was a sham. ' 29 The jury concluded that the defendant had discriminated
against Kolstad on the basis of sex and awarded backpay. ° The District
Court refused to give a jury instruction for punitive damages, a decision
that Kolstad appealed.3 A panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the
lower court decision denying Kolstad's request for punitive damages.2
The defendant argued that legislative history showed that punitive dam-
ages were available only when the behavior was "extraordinarily egre-
gious."'' The plaintiff argued the legislative history suggested that Title
VII and § 1981 had the same standards, implying no egregious behavior
requirement.34 In reaching its decision, the panel relied on the Smith deci-
sion, recognizing that evidence sufficient to show liability is sufficient
for an award of punitive damages, as long as the jury "finds that the con-
duct merits a punitive award. 35 The court thus required no additional
evidence than that required for liability. The court noted that this did not
23. See Smith, 461 U.S. at 53. See, e.g., Beauford v. Sisters of Merc-Provine of
Detroit, Inc., 816 F. 2d 1104 (6th Cir. 1987) (allowing punitive damages in cases where
there is showing of willfulness or malice or egregious conduct by the defendant).
24. See, e.g., Black v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 865 F.2d 1267 (6th Cir. 1989)
(although plaintiff was subject to verbal and physical racial abuse, there were insufficient
findings to award punitive damages).
25. 119 S. Ct. 2118 (1999).
26. See Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 139 F.3d958, 960 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
27. See id.
28. See Kolstad, 119 S.Ct. 2118, 2121 (1999).
29. Id. Kolstad asserted that the promotion decision had been made even prior to the
interview process and the reasons stated by the defendant for selecting the other candidate
were pretext for discrimination. Id. Additionally, there was evidence that the Executive
Director who made the final decision regarding the promotion changed the job description
to meet the male candidate's qualifications, and had made sexually offensive jokes and
used derogatory language toward women. Id.
30. See id. Kolstad was awarded $52,718 in backpay, the amount she would have
gained if promoted to the position. See id.
31. See id.
32. See Kolstad, 108 F.3d 1431, 1435 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
33. Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 108 F.1431, 1437 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
34. See Kolstad, 108 F.3d at 1437.
35. Id. at 1438.
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imply, however, that punitive damages will be awarded in every case of
liability.36
The Appeals Court reheard the case en banc.i The Appeals Court
concluded that in order for the instruction to be given, the "evidence of
the defendant's culpability must exceed what is needed to show inten-
tional discrimination. 38 The court therefore required a showing of "egre-
gious conduct" by the employer.39
The Supreme Court granted certiorari specifically to resolve the con-
flict as to when a jury may award punitive damages.40  The Supreme
Court agreed that the language of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 requires a
separate standard for recovery of punitive damages." The Court con-
cluded that Congress intended that the plaintiff must meet a higher stan-
dard than that required for compensatory damages. 2 When confronting
the question of what that standard should be, the Court felt that the terms
"malice or reckless indifference .... ultimately focused on the actor's
state of mind.4 3 The Court then stated that the proper standard is whether
the employer engaged in the conduct with the "knowledge that it may be
acting in violation of federal law. ' '" Thus, in order for an employer to be
liable for punitive damages, it must "discriminate in the face of a per-
ceived risk that its action will violate federal law.4 5 This may or may not
include a showing of "egregious conduct." 6
B. TenthCircuit
1. Prior to Kolstad
During the past year, the Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of the
standard applied when awarding punitive damages in federal employ-
ment actions, specifically Title VII, ADA, and section 1981, in at least
three instances.47 Prior to Kolstad, the standard applied was vague, possi-
36. See id. The Court recognized that there are situations where there can be liability
without awarding punitive damages, such as a situation where the defendant is uses a
defense of bona fide occupational qualification or affirmative action. See id.
37. See Kolstad, 139 F.3d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
38. Kolstad, 139 F.3d at 965.
39. Id.
40. See Kolstad, 119 S.Ct. 2118 (1998).
41. See Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2124. The Court relied on the language of § 1981(a) to
determine that Congress intended punitive awards in a subset of cases in which
compensatory damages are awarded. See id. Therefore, the statute is often referred to as





46. See Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 119 S. Ct. 2118, 2124 (1999).
47. See Karnes v. Colorado Funeral Servs., Inc., 162 F.3d 1077 (10th Cir. 1998),
Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 164 F.3d 545 (10th Cir. 1999), Baty v. Willamette Indus.,
Inc., 172 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 1999).
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bly as an attempt to avoid definition in the absence of a Supreme Court
decision.
a. Karnes v. Colorado Funeral Servs., Inc.
1. Facts
In Karnes v. Colorado Funeral Servs., Inc.,5 the plaintiff succeeded
on a Title VII discrimination action against her former employer. The
jury awarded lost wages and benefits, emotional damages, and punitive
damages.49 The defendant appealed on the basis that the instructions read
to the jury with regard to burden of proof for award of punitive damages
was incorrect." The defendant requested that the jury be told that in order
to receive punitive damages, Karnes would have to establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that the employer "engaged in a discriminatory practice
or discriminatory practices with malice or reckless indifference to the
rights of Karnes to be free from such intentional discrimination in em-
ployment."5' The district court refused to give this instruction.52
2. Decision
The appeals court upheld the punitive award after concluding that the
federal law was not deficient in defining a burden of proof for awarding
punitive damages. 3 The court stated that the legislative purpose in en-
acting the Title VII provision was to end discrimination and make in-
jured plaintiffs whole.54 Another legislative goal was to expand relief
available to plaintiffs of employment discrimination, thereby encourag-
ing prevention of discrimination in the first place. 5 According to the
Karnes court, the act allows Title VII "the same kinds of monetary re-
lief' that are traditionally available to other civil rights plaintiffs, in-
cluding section 1981 plaintiffs. 6 The main issue to the Karnes court was
the burden of proof to be applied when instructing the jury whether to
consider punitive damages. " The court, however, did recognize the im-
portant policy behind the statute.
48. 162 F.3d 1077 (10th Cir. 1998).
49. See id. at 1079.
50. See id. at 1077.
51. Id. (quoting defendant's app. at 53).
52. See id. at 1079.
53. See id. at 1081.
54. See id. at 1080. The court stated specifically the legislation was enacted to
"further Title ViI's 'central statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination throughout
the economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination."
Id. (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 254, (1994)) (quoting Albermarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975)).
55. See Karnes, 164 F.3d at 1080.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 1082.
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b. Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc.
1. Facts
In Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc.,5" the plaintiff succeeded in a Title
VII race discrimination retaliation action and was awarded punitive dam-
ages.59 Medlock worked for Ortho Biotech for two years prior to ex-
pressing dissatisfaction with his job, including his level of pay. 6° Med-
lock's complaints reached the ears of his supervisors and were discussed
within their meetings.6' Management conducted investigation and gave
Medlock opportunities to improve his "BAD attitude and his dislike for
Ortho Biotech and [it's] policies ... Once Medlock filed administra-
tive charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") stating that his pay was a result of racial discrimination, he
was eventually terminated.63 On appeal, the defendant claimed the evi-
dence was insufficient to award punitive damages.6
2. Decision
The court noted that it had not yet determined what burden the plain-
tiff must meet to show malice or reckless indifference, yet quickly con-
cluded it was met in this case.65 Medlock had produced sufficient evi-
dence to prove retaliation and had additionally produced a letter in which
his employer acknowledged his right to pursue a lawsuit without retalia-
tion.66 These factors contributed to the court's upholding the punitive
damage award.
c. Baty v. Willamette Indus., Inc.
1. Facts
In Baty v. Willamette Indus., Inc, 67 decided in April of 1999, the
plaintiff succeeded under a Title VII sexual harassment and retaliation
claim against her employer in a jury trial.68 Ms. Baty worked as a tempo-
rary employee at Willamette's corrugated box plant. 69 A coworker of
58. 164 F.3d 545 (10th Cir. 1999).
59. See Medlock, 164 F.3d at 549.
60. See id. at 548. Medlock first confronted his manager after learning his scheduled
pay increase was going to be postponed for six months. See id.
61. See id.
62. Id. at 549.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 551.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. 172 F. 3d 1232 (10th Cir. 1999).
68. See Baty, 172 F.3d at 1236.
69. See id.
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Baty's made various sexual comments to her.7° When she reported this to
her supervisor, he told her that he would take care of the problem.7'
Shortly after, Baty worked near another man who also made sexually
offensive comments toward her. 2 She reported this to another supervi-
sor, who said he would talk to her co-worker.73 During the same time,
Baty's other supervisor grabbed her waist and invited her to the local bar
for drinks. 4 Baty later heard the maintenance supervisor making sexual
comments about her.75 He then gave her "performance evaluations" con-
taining sexual content.76 Baty continued to complain, at which point one
supervisor was told to apologize] 7 She eventually called the company's
toll-free hotline, and an investigation ensued.78 Baty was terminated
shortly after the investigation. 79 The jury awarded her compensatory and
punitive damages, which the court reduced to meet the cap requirement.0
On appeal, Willamette argued that there was insufficient evidence to
warrant an award of punitive damages, among many other arguments.8 '
2. Decision
Like the analysis in Medlock, the court again recognized the fact that
it had not established the proof required of the plaintiff when awarding
punitive damages, yet concluded the plaintiff had met that burden. 82 Baty
was successful at proving that she was a victim of sexual harassment and
retaliation." Mentioning the lower court Kolstad decision, the court con-
cluded that Baty should receive punitive damages, "even assuming Ms.
Baty must show something more than merely intentional discrimination
under Title VII." 8 The court based its decision on the management's
70. See id. at 1237. Baty's coworker made comments that Baty "had his wife beat in
the boob department," that she "had a nice butt," and there was graffiti on the men's
bathroom wall suggesting they were having an affair. Id.
71. See id.
72. See id. The coworker commented on "what turned [her] on, what made[herl hot"
and "what her attitude toward oral sex was." Id.




77. See id. at 1238.
78. See Baty v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 172 F.3d 1232, 1238-1239 (10th Cir. 1999).
The personnel staff interviewed Baty and every male about whom she had complained,
conducted sexual harassment training sessions, and concluded no sexual harassment had
occurred. See id. at 1239.
79. See id. Baty was told there was no longer a position for her, and that a worldwide
paper shortage was expected so that the plant would no longer be able to afford her salary.
Id. During that same period, prices and revenues increased and the budget created prior to
her termination predicted an increase in production. Id.
80. See id. at 1240. Compensatory and punitive damages are limited to a $300,000
cap. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1994).
81. See Baty, 172 F.3d at 1240.





response to her complaints: 5 management did not really respond to
Baty's complaints, conducted a sham investigation, and management
employees condoned the harassment.s6 With regard to the retaliation
claim, management showed resentment toward the plaintiff and gave the
plaintiff "what could be viewed as patently false reasons" for her termi-
nati6n. The court did not recognize, as it did in the Medlock case, any
direct evidence that the employer specifically acknowledged Baty's right
to sue.
2. Post Kolstad
a. EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
1. Facts
The Tenth Circuit most recently applied the decision in Kolstad in an
unpublished opinion. In EEOC v. Wal-Mart,9 the plaintiff sued under
the ADA. Wal-Mart hired Mr. Amaro knowing that he was hearing-
impaired and would require an interpreter at times.9° Two years after his
hiring, Amaro left a mandatory training meeting because there was nei-
ther closed captioning in the video or an interpreter.9' He was then trans-
ferred from the receiving department to a janitorial position. Amaro
viewed that transfer as a demotion and asked for an interpreter to explain
the change.93 Amaro threatened to contact the EEOC when Wal-Mart
refused to provide an interpreter, and he was suspended.94 A week later,
Amaro met with an interpreter and two managers, who again told Amaro
of his transfer.9 Amaro refused the transfer and was terminated.96 The
jury awarded compensatory and punitive damages. On appeal, Wal-Mart
argued that punitive damages were incorrectly awarded.
2. Decision
In reaching its decision, the Tenth Circuit relied heavily on Kolstad,
interpreting that the Supreme Court intended to create a higher standard
85. See id. at 1244 -1245.
86. See Baty v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 172 F.3d 1232, 1245 (10th Cir. 1999).
87. Id.
88. See EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 98-2015, 1999 WL 638210, at *1 (10th
Cir. Aug. 23, 1999).
89. EEOC, 1999 WL 638210, at *1.
90. See id.
91. See id. Amaro's supervisor ordered him to return to the presentation, offering a
coworker who could fingerspell, but was not a certified interpreter. Id. at * 1-2.
92. See id.
93. See id. at *2.
94. See EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 98-2015, 1999 WL 638210, at *2 (10th
Cir. Aug. 23, 1999).
95. See id.
96. See id. Amaro felt he was being transferred because he refused to attend the
training session. See id.
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than mere liability for punitive awards.97 The court stated that the analy-
sis should consist of the actor's state of mind, which may include a
showing of egregious misconduct.98 In this case, the evidence showed
that Wal-Mart was aware of the need for compliance under the ADA.99
Wal-Mart knew the plaintiff was hearing impaired and that he would
require aids for his training.'0° A qualified interpreter was not provided,
however, until the company informed him of his termination.' °' The
manager also testified that he was familiar with the ADA and its accom-
modation requirements, as well as its prohibition against discrimination
and retaliation.' 2 This evidence was appropriate to meet the Kolstad
analysis requirement according to the Tenth Circuit.' 3 The jury properly
concluded that "Wal-Mart intentionally discriminated against [the plain-
tiff] in the face of a perceived risk that its action would violate federal
law."""°
b. Knowlton v. Teltrust Phones, Inc.
1. Facts
The Tenth Circuit also addressed punitive damages since the Kolstad
decision in Knowlton v. Teltrust Phones, Inc,'05 another unpublished de-
cision. Knowlton alleged that her supervisor had sexually harassed her.
6
Her supervisor's conduct included sexually explicit language and be-
havior. He even refused to 'approve her contracts with new clients unless
she would agree to perform oral sex.' 7 When she complained to man-
agement, the supervisor was transferred to another position within the
company.0 8 Knowlton then resigned because she feared any further con-
tact with her former supervisor. '°9 The plaintiff succeeded against the
defendant company with regard to her sexual harassment claim, yet the
97. See EEOC, 1999 WL 638210, at *3.
98. See id.
99. See id. at *2.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 98-2015, 1999 WL 638210, at *4.
103. See id.
104. Id.
105. See Knowlton v. Teltrust Phones, Inc., No. 97-4154, 1999 WL 617662, at *1
(10th Cir. Aug 16, 1999).
106. See Knowlton, 1999 WL 617662, at *2. Knowlton's supervisor used vulgar
language, told sexually explicit jokes, talked about sexual activity of management, made
"sexually charged and insulting" comments, described details of his sex life, and pretended
to masturbate in front of her. Id. He also told Knowlton of his fantasies about her, asked






district court granted a motion for directed verdict against Knowlton on
her claim for punitive damages."'
2., Decision
The court held that the plaintiff "had failed to make a showing of ac-
tual malice or reckless indifference to her federally protected rights.""'
The court recognized the decision in Kolstad."2 According to this stan-
dard, the plaintiff only had to show that she was discriminated against
"in the face of a perceived risk that its actions violate federal law."" 3 The
Knowlton court recognized that prior Tenth Circuit decisions held con-
sistent with this standard, and specifically cited the Baty decision. "'
While the court did not reach a conclusion as to whether Knowlton
should be awarded punitive damages, it did discuss the factors that
should be considered upon remand.' These factors included evidence
that indicated awareness by Teltrust management that the working envi-
ronments contained foul language, sexual innuendo, and sexual ad-
vances."16 More importantly, the management reacted unresponsively as
it allowed continued contact between Knowlton and her harasser after
her complaint."7
C. Other Circuits
1. Prior to Kolstad
The circuit courts conflict as to what the standard for awarding puni-
tive damages should be. Some circuits hold contrary to the Tenth
Circuit."' For example, the Eleventh Circuit often requires that the plain-
tiff show some kind of reckless or egregious behavior by the employer," 9
while the Tenth Circuit considers egregious behavior an optional factor.
Examples of egregious behavior may include "(1) a pattern of discrimi-
nation, (2) spite or malevolence, or (3) a blatant disregard for civil obli-
gations.' 20 This requirement extends beyond the Tenth Circuit's recog-
nition of the need for some type of proof of the employer's knowledge of
the legal rights of the plaintiff.
110. See id.
111. See id. at *5.
112. See id. at *6.
113. See id.
114. See Baty v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 172 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 1999). In Baty, the
court analyzed factors such as management's response to her complaints, the
management's conducting of a sham investigation, and management's condoning of the
harassment. See id. at 1244.
115. See Knowlton, 1999 WL 617662, at *6-7.
116. See id.
117. See id. at *7.
118. See, generally, Emmel v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, 95 F.3d 627 (7th
Cir. 1996); Dudley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d 1317 (11 th Cir. 1999).
119. See Dudley, 166F.3dat1322.
120. Id. at 1323.
2000]
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The Fourth Circuit consistently requires a heightened standard above
that required for compensatory damages, yet is not clear in its applica-
tion."' For example in Cline v. Wal-Mart,2 the court quickly established
that there is a requirement of egregious conduct in order to award puni-
tive damages, yet did not require proof of knowledge of the plaintiffs
rights by the employer.12 Further, after finding evidence of egregious
conduct, the court reduced the amount of punitive damages awarded by
the jury, although the amount was not above the maximum cap allowed
under Title VII.' 4 However, in Harris v. L & L Wings,121 the court spe-
cifically recognized the need for proof that the employer acted with in-
difference to the employee's rights, 26 similar to the Tenth Circuit. The
Seventh Circuit reflects a similar pattern of inconsistency.'
While these circuits require a heightened standard, some circuits hold
that evidence of liability may be enough to award punitive damages. For
example, in the Second Circuit in Luciano v. Olsten Corp 28 examined the
language of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and determined that nothing
indicated that a showing egregious conduct was required.'29 The statutory
language merely indicated the same requirement for any civil rights laws,
that the employer's behavior was "motivated by evil motive or intent, or
when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally pro-
tected rights of others.' 30 The Ninth Circuit has also held that the stan-
dard for liability and punitive damages may be the same. 3' This is sub-
ject to the jury's analysis of punishment and deterrence requirements.'32
2. Post Kolstad
Since the Kolstad decision, only two other circuits besides the Tenth
Circuit have addressed the issue of punitive damages.' 33 Both of the cases
involved section 1983 actions, so they are only partially relevant to the
121. See Harris v. L & L Wings, Inc., 132 F. 3d 978 (4th Cir. 1997), but see, Cline v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F. 3d 294 (4th Cir. 1997) (establishing heightened standard for
punitive damages, but not clear in application).
122. 144 F.3d at 294.
123. See id. at 306.
124. See id.
125. 132 F.3d 978 (4th Cir. 1997).
126. See Harris, 132 F. 3d at 983 (4th Cir. 1997).
127. See Emmel v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, 95 F. 3d 627, 636 (7th Cir.
1996) (requiring the plaintiff to meet a heightened standard of showing egregious conduct
by the employer), but see, Merriweather v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 103 F. 3d 576, 581
(7th Cir. 1996) (disagreeing with the heightened standard requirement and holding proof of
liability is sufficient to award punitive damages).
128. 110 F. 3d 210 (2d Cir. 1997).
129. Luciano, 110 F.3d at 219-20.
130. Id. at 220.
131. See Ngo v. Reno Hilton Resort Corp., 140 F. 3d 1299, 1302 (9th Cir. 1998).
132. See Ngo, 140 F.3d at 1302.
133. See lacobucci v. Boulter, Nos. 97-1485 & 97-1585, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 24622
(1st Cir. Oct. 4, 1999); Smith v. Pepersack, No. 98-1842, 1999 U.S.App. LEXIS 23223
(4th Cit. Sept. 24, 1999).
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foregoing analysis. Relying on Smith v. Wade,'- both courts recognized
that the analysis developed in Kolstad was applicable to section 1983
actions. Both circuits accepted the decision as explicitly rejecting the
heightened standard of egregious conduct for awarding punitive dam-
ages. According to the courts, defendants may be liable for punitive
damages upon a showing the of defendant's "knowledge that he may be
acting in violation of federal law, not his awareness that he is engaging in
discrimination."'35 In one case, Smith v. Pepersack136 the plaintiff filed
gender discrimination and sexual harassment claims under section 1983.
The court in Smith felt that there was no way the defendants could argue
they were unaware of a federal prohibition of sex discrimination. 37 Fur-
thermore, the defendants did not argue that they had denied her promo-
tions for a legitimate, work-related reason. 38 Under such circumstances,
the court found this evidence enough such that the jury could award pu-
nitive damages. 39
D. Analysis
Within the past year, Tenth Circuit decisions awarding punitive dam-
ages have evolved. Near the beginning of 1999, the courts addressed the
issue by recognizing that a standard needed to be established, and then
simply awarding or not awarding punitive damages on a seemingly ad
hoc basis. For instance, the courts in Karnes and Medlock each gave brief
analysis of what is required for punitive damages and recognized that the
circuit had not clearly defined the issue. Moreover, Medlock and Baty
quickly concluded that the standard had been met without much analysis.
Baty alluded to the Kolstad standard, yet seemed hesitant to really adopt
it as a standard for the circuit at the time.
Before the Kolstad decision in July of this year, the circuits had trou-
ble reaching any type of consistency as to when punitive damages may
be awarded to the plaintiff in federal employment actions. The troubling
vagueness of the statute caused problems even within the Tenth Circuit.
Now that the Supreme Court has established a standard, the circuits
should reach consistency. Most recent decisions like EEOC and Knowl-
ton reflect a trend toward reliance on the Kolstad decision as a standard.
The Tenth Circuit now seems to require a showing of knowledge on be-
134. See 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983).
135. lacobucci, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 24622, at *30; Smith, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS
24622, at *13 (quoting Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2124).
136. See Smith, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 23223.
137. See id. at *15.
138. See id.
139. See id. The other post-Kolstad case, lacobucci v. Boulter, Nos. 97-1485 & 97-
1585, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 24622, (1st Cir. 1999), is not helpful to this analysis because
it involved false arrest and excessive force claims, rather than an action related to
employment which is the focus of this survey. Under §1983, an individual can sue
government employees for civil rights actions, which is of much broader scope than this
analysis. Also, §1983 actions involve complicated analysis of burdens and immunities,
which are beyond the scope of this survey.
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half of the employer of a risk of violating federal law, of which egregious
conduct may be a factor.'" The analysis will further include discussion
of management reaction, or lack of reaction, to any complaints.' 4 This is
consistent with the decision in Kolstad.
The standard to be applied for punitive damages is whether the em-
ployer acted with reckless indifference to the plaintiffs federally pro-
tected rights. 42 Egregious conduct may be a showing to aid in this analy-
sis, but is not required.'4 3 When an employer is found liable, he is not
automatically responsible for punitive damages, because award of puni-
tive damages requires a finding that the employer intended to discrimi-
nate, apart from his knowledge of the plaintiff's rights.
Arguably, the. standard applied is not the same intended by Congress.
Some commentators believe congressional intent behind the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 to be different.' Looking to legislative history, it can be
argued that during the passage of the Civil Rights Act, the expressed
intention was to require a heightened standard for punitive damages.
4 5
Other commentators suggest that congressional intent was to unify the
standards under all employment actions, so that the framework would be
similar to that under section 1981.146
Regardless of the conclusion reached with regard to legislative pur-
pose, the court's decision with regard to this punitive damages standard
first appears to be friendly to the plaintiff. 14 The plaintiff does not have
to show egregious conduct to be awarded punitive damages. This deci-
sion may place fear in the heatts of some scholars who believe this deci-
sion is contrary to "current trends in punitive damages jurisprudence.'
4
1
The possibility of punitive damage availability is often blamed for the
increase in unnecessary litigation. 49 However, in a recent compilation of
studies done by a variety of organizations and scholars, the conclusion is
140. See EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 98-2015, 1999 WL 638210, at *3 (10th
Cir. Aug. 23, 1999).
141. See Knowlton v. Teltrust Phones, Inc., No. 97-4154, 1999 WL 617662 at *6-*7
(10th Cir. Aug. 16, 1999).
142. See Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 119 S.Ct. 2118 (1999).
143. See id.
144. See Wise, supra note 5, at 654.
145. See 137 Cong. Rec. S15473 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (memorandum of Senator
Dole stating that punitive damages should only be available in extraordinarily egregious
cases); H.R. Rep. No. 40(1), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 72, (1991) (stating plaintiffs must meet
a higher standard than liability for punitive damages).
146. See Johnson, supra note 5, at 60.
147. This statement is without regard to the Kolstad decision about vicarious liability,
which is employer friendly. The vicarious liability holdings of Kolstad will be discussed
infra.
148. See Wise, supra note 5, at 654.
149. See Michael Rustad, The Incidence, Scope, and Purpose of Punitive Damages,
1998 Wis. L. REV. 15, 16 n.5 (1998).
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that there is no nationwide punitive damage crisis.'5 ° One of the studies
examined, done by the Justice Department, found that punitive damages
are only awarded in six percent of cases where the plaintiff won.' The
rate and size of punitive damage awards varied by the field of law.'
52
However, the rate of punitive damage awards for employment actions
was twenty-seven percent, the second highest of the substantive fields
examined.'5 3 Importantly, the highest percentage increase in punitive
damages was against businesses, including sexual harassment and
wrongful discharge claims.'54 Of course, a factor considered in deter-
mining punitive damages is the wealth of the losing party,'55 because the
purpose of punitive damages is to deter and punish the behavior. This
may explain the higher rate of punitive damage awards in employment
actions in comparison to other fields of law, because businesses usually
have more money than individuals.' 6 However, based on recent studies,
there is no tangible punitive damage crisis. '
Despite criticism that the Kolstad decision violates legislative history
and punitive damage jurisprudence, the decision was one desperately
needed by the lower circuits. The circuits now have a consistent standard
that is similar to other employment rights law. Moreover, the decision
does nothing to violate a substantial amount of concern expressed in
legislative history. Nor is it imperative that the decision will open the
floodgates to punitive damages for two reasons. First, jurisdictions that
have been applying a standard like Kolstad prior to the decision are not
complaining of higher damage awards. Second, the other part of the Kol-
stad holding regarding vicarious liability will serve as a major obstacle,
as discussed below.
III. EMPLOYERS' VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. Background
Because some courts require analysis of the employer's state of mind
to award punitive damages, vicarious liability is often a simultaneous
issue. The act of discrimination is usually not carried out by the em-
ployer, but by an agent of the employer, such as a supervisor.'58 Some
courts will impute the liability to the employer for the agent's behavior,
150. See id. at 21. The studies showed that punitive damages are not routinely
awarded, nor given in outrageous amounts. See id.
151. See id. at 25.
152. See id. at 27.
153. See id. The rate of punitive damage awards was higher only on libel and slander
cases. See id.
154. See id. at 37.
155. See id. at 47.
156. See Avon Sergeant, Are the Legal Remedies Available to Sexually Harasses
Women Adequate?, 20 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 185, 185 (1999).
157. See id.
158. See Johnson, supra note 5, at 79.
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yet will refuse to do so for punitive damage liability.'"9 The language of
Title VII only provides for "employer liability." '6° However, courts rec-
ognize that an individual employee's actions may subject the employer to
liability.' 6' Recently, the courts are fairly unanimous in holding that the
employer is liable for a supervisor's actions when that supervisor was
involved in tangible employment actions, like hiring and firing. 62 This
was established in response to considerably recent Supreme Court deci-
sions. 161
1. Supreme Court Treatment
In 1986, the Supreme Court relied on Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission (EEOC) guidelines to establish what law applies to
vicarious liability in federal employment actions.' 64 In Meritor Savings v.
Vinson, 65 the court recognized that the EEOC guidelines suggest that
when a supervisor exercises authority delegated to him by the employer
by making or threatening to make employment decisions, the actions are
properly imputed to the employer.' 66 This analysis, based on basic
agency principles, would lead to an examination of the job functions and
circumstances specific to the case.161
Much more recently, the Supreme Court addressed the issue again in
an attempt to clarify its holding in Meritor.68 The Supreme Court de-
cided two opinions on the same day that specifically addressed em-
ployer's vicarious liability in sexual harassment Title VII actions.' 69 In
both decisions, the court modified the Meritor holding relying on the
Restatement of Agency Principles directly.'70 According to the holdings,
the proper question is whether the behavior is within the scope of the
supervisor's employment. 7' However, generally the motivation behind
159. See Splunge v. Shoney's, Inc., 97 F 3d 488 (11th Cir. 1996) (allowing
compensatory but not punitive damages to be awarded against the employer). In this case,
the hostile work environment was so blatant that the defendants did not contest the issue.
Id. at 489. Because the sexual harassment policy was never communicated to the plaintiffs
and higher management should have known about the harassment, the court awarded
compensatory damages. However, the court refused to grant punitive damages because the
plaintiffs had not complained to "higher management." Id.
160. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988).
161. See Patterson v. P.H.P. Healthcare Corp., 90 F. 3d 927, 942 (5th Cir. 1996).
162. See Johnson, supra note 5, at 81.
163. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S.Ct. 2275 (1998); Burlington Indus.,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S.Ct. 2257 (1998).
164. See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB, v. Vinson, 47 U.S. 57 (1986).
165. See Meritor, 47 U.S. at 57.
166. See id. at 70-71.
167. See id. at 71.
168. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2282 (1998).
169. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2282; Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct.
2257 (1998).




sexual harassment is not within the scope of employment.7 2 According to
these decisions, the employer may also be liable for conduct of a super-
visor made possible by abuse of the supervisor's authority. 73 This princi-
ple is based on the public policy that there will generally be fewer ave-
nues available for an employee to report the behavior. 74 The court recog-
nized, however, that it needed to square this decision with Meritor's
holding since Meritor proscribed that the employer was not automati-
cally liable.' 75 In doing so, the Court stated that one reason for continuing
to honor the decision in Meritor was the fact that the Civil Rights Act of
1991 allowed compensatory and punitive damages. 7 6 The court recog-
nized that when passing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress chose to
leave the Meritor holding in place. 7 7 Therefore, by passing the Act ex-
panding employer's potential liability, Congress chose to affirm the lim-
its imposed by Meritor.' Burlington also limited employer liability,
thereby reaffirming the Meritor decision that there should not be auto-
matic liability, by stating that the employer specifically aids in commis-
sion of the harassment when the supervisor performs a "tangible em-
ployment action against the subordinate," such as hiring, promoting, or
firing. 79 When there is no tangible action, the employer may raise an
affirmative defense to liability or damages. s°
2. Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n.
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of vicarious liability in rela-
tion to punitive damages in its decision in Kolstad.8' The Court exam-
ined the purposes of Title VII and concluded that it is against the policy
of Title VII to assess employers' punitive damages even when they make
good faith efforts to comply with the law. 82 Assessing punitive damages
may have the effect of discouraging employers from implementing anti-
discrimination policies in the first place. 83 By having a policy established
within the workplace, the employer would obviously be acknowledging
the employee's right to sue. The court felt that this is contrary to Title
172. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2267.
173. See id.
174. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2291.
175. See id. The court's recognition of vicarious liability for misuse of supervisor
authority makes the risk of automatic liability high because it requires analysis of whether
the employer aided the supervisor by granting him the authority in the first place. Giving
the supervisor his job can make the employer liable because it has granted the supervisor
the authority that he is allegedly now misusing. See id.
176. See id. at n.4.
177. See id at 2291.
178. See id.
179. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2268.
180. See id. This affirmative defense consists of two elements: 1) that the employer
used reasonable care to prevent and correct any sexually harassing behavior; and 2) the
plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of preventive or corrective opportunities
provided. Id.
181. 119 S. Ct. 2118, 2119 (1999).
182. See id. at 2126.
183. See id. at 2129.
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VII's preventive purpose. 8M However, the Court failed to determine what
kind of "good faith" effort the employer would have to make to avoid
liability. Additionally, the court recognized an intent by Congress to
leave the holding in Meritor intact.'
85
The court also questioned what qualified as "managerial capacity.' ' 6
The court stated that the employee need be important but not top man-
agement, officers, and directors. 8 7 Moreover, the court decided it needed
to modify the rules with regard to "scope of employment."'' 8' Within the
context of punitive damages, an employer now cannot be vicariously
liable for "discriminatory employment decisions of managerial agents
where these decisions are contrary to the employer's 'good faith efforts
to comply with Title VII."" 89 Therefore, an employer will not be liable
for a manager who discriminates within the scope of his employment if
the employer can show good faith efforts to comply with the statute."
However, as previously stated in Burlington, the employer aided in the
action where the manager performed a "tangible employment action."' 9'
Although in Kolstad the manager was promoting and therefore perform-
ing a tangible employment action, the court did not decide whether he
was acting in managerial capacity.' 92 Therefore, while Kolstad cleared up
the standard for punitive damages liability for the plaintiff, it confused
vicarious liability to the detriment of future plaintiffs.
B. Tenth Circuit
1. Prior to Kolstad
Since Burlington and Faragher, the Tenth Circuit has applied stan-
dards as illustrated in the following cases:1
9 3
a. Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc.
1. Facts
Ms. Harrison worked as an underground miner as the only female in
a group of about thirty men.' 94 Mr. Brown was the underground shift
foreman and was Harrison's supervisor.'95 On various occasions, Brown
184. See id.
185. See Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 119 S. Ct. 2118, 2127 (1999).
186. See id. at 2128.
187. See id.
188. See id. at 2129.
189. See id. (quoting Meritor Savings Bank, FSB, v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986)).
190. See Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 119 S. Ct. 2118, 2129 (1999).
191. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2268 (1998).
192. See id.
193. See Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 158 F.3d 1371 (10th Cir. 1998); Baty v.
Willamette Indus., Inc., 172 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 1999).
194. See Harrison v. Eddie Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437, 1440 (10th Cir. 1997).
195. See Harrison, 112 F.3d at 1440. Harrison received her assignments from Brown
and reported to him if she was sick or needed vacation. See id.
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approached Harrison and made sexually suggestive comments and ac-
tions. "'6 Once Brown began assigning her to projects without a partner
and she realized the problem was not going away, she began calling in
sick and taking vacation days.' 97 Harrison then contacted a manager
within the safety office and told him what was happening. '" He con-
tacted the human resources manager, who put her on administrative leave
pending the outcome of the investigation.' 99 As a result of the investiga-
tion, the human resources manager concluded that Brown had done any-
thing illegal based on his view of the relationship, but his behavior was
inappropriate. 200 The report stated that Harrison would be compensated
for any missed work, provided medical treatment, and moved to a new
section of the mine.20 ' Brown was reprimanded, put on probation, and
ordered to have no contact with Harrison other than what was "abso-
lutely necessary. '202 Harrison remained on the payroll but never returned
to work, and was eventually terminated due to a reduction in
workforce.23 During these incidents, Potash had a sexual harassment
policy.2 4 However, Harrison was not aware of it until she happened to be
working in a different section of the mine and noticed it posted on that
shop's bulletin board.0 5
Harrison brought a Title VII hostile work environment sexual har-
assment claim against Brown and Potash and lost with regard to that
claim. 2 6 During first appeal, Harrison claimed that Brown capitalized on
his supervisor authority to force her to suffer through a "prolonged, vio-
lent, and demeaning sexual relationship. 2 7 Because the supervisor
abused his authority, the employer should be liable for the hostile work
environment Brown created.2 ' The court reversed and remanded the dis-
trict court finding because the jury instructions were inadequate.29 After
the Supreme Court's decision in Faragher, the case was remanded again
in light of that decision.
196. See id. Brown would take Harrison to an isolated section of the mine, try to kiss
and touch her breasts and between her legs, and eventually expose himself and masturbate.








204. See id. Harrison did not learn about the policy until after the incidents occurred.
See id.
205. See Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437, 1442 (10th Cir. 1997). After
seeing the posted policy, she went home and tried to find the policy in her employment
manual, but it was not in those materials. See id.
206. See id. at 1437.
207. See id. at 1445.
208. See id.
209. See id. at 1448-1450.
210. See Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 158 F.3d 1371, 1371 (10th Cir. 1998).
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2. Decision
On remand, the plaintiff asserted various theories of vicarious liabil-
ity.
21 ' First, she asserted that because the supervisor had significant con-
trol over her conditions of employment, he should be considered the "al-
ter ego" of the employer.22 Second, she asserted that her supervisor was
acting with "apparent authority" when he harassed her.13 The court re-
jected both of these theories because they were not recognized as valid
theories of employer vicarious liability under Faragher and Burlington.2 4
The court also felt that it was correct in dismissing managerial capacity
as a theory. 25 Her final theory, however, rested on misuse of supervisor
authority.2 6  The court relied on this theory in reversing in her favor,
primarily because it was the standard established by Faragher.27 The
Tenth Circuit adopted the Faragher standard for employer liability.2 8
The evidence in this case indicated that Brown "had actual and immedi-
ate supervisory authority to sexually harass her," and reversed the judg-
211ment against Harrison.
b. Baty v. Willamette Indus., Inc.
1. Facts
In Baty, 22° the plaintiff argued that Willamette was both directly liable
and vicariously liable.22' Baty had suffered various sexual comments
from co-workers.222 She first told a supervisor who said he would take
care of the problem.223 She also complained to other supervisors and was
211. See Harrison, 158 F.3d at 1376.
212. Id. Harrison claimed that Brown had a significant amount of managerial control,




216. See id. at 1377.
217. See Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 158 F.3d 1371, 1377 (10th Cir. 1998).
218. See id. at 1375. Recall that according to Faragher and Burlington, "an employer
is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile work
environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority
over the employee. When no tangible employment action is taken, a defending employer
may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages . . ." See id. The defendant
attempted to argue an affirmative defense, but was denied because it had failed to do so at
the first trial. See id.
219. See id. at 1377.
220. 172 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 1999). For more discussion of the facts, see above.
221. See Baty, 172 F.3d at 1242. An employer is directly liable for hostile work
environment sexual harassment if it knew or should have known about the behavior and
failed to stop it. See id. Baty argued Willamette "knew or should have known about the
conduct." Id. In response, the defendant claimed its response was adequate. See id. Due to
Baty's failure to meet the EEOC filing requirement in a timely manner, the incidents
considered for damages basically involved coworker harassment. See id at 1242.
Therefore, the Court focused its analysis on vicarious liability. See id.
222. See id. at 1237-1238.
223. See id.
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harassed by one particular supervisor on various occasions.224 In response
to her complaint regarding a supervisor referring to her as "bouncing
Betty," the company told the supervisor to apologize.225 When she com-
plained about explicit graffiti on the walls about her, the company hired a
handwriting expert to analyze the writing.226 Once Baty finally made an
anonymous call to the company's toll-free hotline, an investigation took
place.227 The investigation consisted of interviews, training sessions, and
a reminder of Willamette's no tolerance attitude toward sexual harass-
ment.228 Although Willamette had a written policy against sexual harass-
ment, Baty and other employees testified they never heard of the policy
until the investigation. 2' 9 Additionally, employees received no trainingregarding sexual harassment.23
2. Decision
In Baty v. Willamette, the Tenth Circuit's analysis of vicarious liabil-
ity consisted of examination of whether the defendant took reasonable
action to stop the harassment or in fact stopped it after it had knowledge
of the harassment.2 1' Relying on Burlington, the court noted that em-
ployer vicarious liability was subject to the affirmative defense "that the
employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any
sexually harassing behavior., 232 In this case the court felt management
clearly knew about the harassment, so the focus then turned to whether
Willamette's response was adequate.233 Despite the fact that Baty com-
plained to supervisors, the company maintained a "lackadaisical" attitude
toward the harassment. 234 The company's behavior in response to her
complaints, together with the lack of training regarding sexual harass-




225. See id. at 1238.
226. See id. The perpetrators of the graffiti where never identified. See id.
227. See Baty v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 172 F.3d 1232, 1238 (10th Cir. 1999).
Willamette's Regional Personnel Manager and his assistant went to the plant and
conducted interviews with Baty, every female at the plant, and every male employee that




231. See id. at 1242.
232. See id. (quoting Burlington, 118 S.Ct. at 2270).
233. See Baty, 172 F.3d at 1242.
234. Id. There was also evidence that there was only a small amount of training given
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2. Post Kolstad
These earlier Tenth Circuit decisions finally came under the light of
Kolstad in EEOC v. Wal-Mart.36 Relying on Kolstad, the court held that
important to vicarious liability is the extent to which the employer has
adopted anti-discrimination policies and educated its employees. In
this particular case, Wal-Mart did have a written policy against discrimi-
nation, but the court felt that the evidence was not convincing that Wal-
Mart had made a good faith effort to educate it's employees.238 Wal-Mart
asserted that it had a generalized policy for equality and respect of indi-
viduals.239 However, the court felt that evidence of the personnel manager
having no employment discrimination training, as well as no handbook,
was proper evidence of lack of effort on behalf of Wal-Mart. 240 The court
did not discuss whether the acting supervisor was acting "within the
scope of employment" as it probably would have according to Burlington
and Faragher analysis. Instead, the decision focused on the good faith
effort made or not made by Wal-Mart.
C. Other Circuits
Other circuits have confronted the idea of vicarious liability in rela-
tion to punitive damages. For example, the Fifth Circuit is fairly active
in this area. In Patterson v. P.H.P. Healthcare Corp. ,24 the Fifth Circuit
held that a court could not award punitive damages against the employer
when the record had no evidence that the employer took part in any dis-
'42criminatory, malicious, or reckless conduct. In Patterson, the conduct
seemed to be limited to one project manager. 243 Despite the fact that the
employer distributed handbooks and complaint procedures to employees,
the plaintiffs did not follow any of the procedures. 244 As a result, the em-
ployer had no reason to know what was occurring. 245 The court also re-
fused to impute vicarious liability because the actor was a "project man-
ager" rather than a "corporate officer. '' 246 In Deffenbaugh-Willaims v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.24 7 the Fifth Circuit recognized that this analysis had
to be modified to meet the Faragher and Burlington standards. This
meant that the actor only need be a supervisor (or higher) to meet vicari-
236. See EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 98-2015, 1999 WL 638210 (10th Cir.
Aug. 23, 1999).
237. See EEOC, 1999 WL 638210, at *5.
238. See id. at *6.
239. See id.
240. See id.
241. 90 F. 3d 927 (5th Cir. 1996).





247. 156 F.3d 581 (5th Cir. 1998).
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ous liability.248 Additionally, the employer could still be held liable on a
misuse of authority theory. 49 Other circuits reflect the recognition of
need to conform to the newly established Burlington and Faragher stan-
dards as well. 50 Since the Kolstad decision, no other circuits have spe-
cifically addressed vicarious liability with regard to punitive damage
awards, leaving much to be determined.
D. Analysis
The Kolstad decision focuses more on the acts of the employer than
the standards established by Burlington and Faragher. However, in
mentioning managerial capacity, the Court also confuses the standard. It
is difficult to predict what courts will do as a result of this holding, espe-
cially in the Tenth Circuit since it expressly abandoned the managerial
capacity test in Potash. The one case that has addressed this issue is the
Tenth Circuit case of EEOC v. Wal-mart.25' The analysis used in this case
consisted of a focus on the employer's effort to make a good faith effort
to comply with Title VII, similar to Kolstad. The same analysis was used
in the Baty decision prior to the decision in Kolstad. The Kolstad deci-
sion, therefore, served as an affirmation of the Tenth Circuit's reasoning
with regard to vicarious liability.
While the Kolstad decision may have initially appeared to open the
door for the federal employment plaintiff with regard to punitive dam-
ages, the Court's holding with regard to vicarious liability is not so
friendly. It is now unclear whether an employer can be held liable for the
actions of a supervisor even if that supervisor effects tangible employ-
ment decisions. A plaintiff that was previously able to show vicarious
liability using the Burlington standards may now be unable to succeed.
Even if her supervisor controlled her hiring and firing, the employer may
not be liable if it made a "good faith" effort to distinguish discrimination.
Since the Court did not define "good faith," a plaintiff has no way to
gauge the validity of her claim. The courts are free to establish minimal
requirements that may indicate a "good faith effort." This decision, there-
fore, may serve as a barrier to future plaintiffs.
This barrier undermines the purpose of statutes like Title VII. The
purpose of such civil rights legislation is to encourage employers to cre-
ate and install policies that both recognize discrimination as a federal law
violation and teach upper management how not to discriminate. If a
plaintiff is unlikely to be successful at suing the employer, and therefore
248. See 156 F.3d at 593.
249. See id.
250. See Delph v. Dr. Pepper Bottling Co., 130 F. 3d 349 (8th Cir. 1997); Splunge v.
Shoney's, Inc., 97 F. 3d 488 (11th Cir. 1996).
251. See id.
2000] DAMAGES 479
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
most likely will not collect damages of value, 252 employees are less likely
to complain about discrimination in the first place. Title VII is meant to
protect the civil rights of all people as a deterrence mechanism. If em-
ployees are afraid to report what they feel may be a Title VII violation
because they may lose their job and reputation with no recourse, Title
VII will become ineffective.
CONCLUSION
Tenth Circuit decisions prior to the Kolstad decision seemed to pre-
dict the Supreme Court's outcome. When comparing the Baty decision,
prior to Kolstad, and the Kolstad decision itself, the two cases are re-
markably similar. Both cases hold that egregious conduct may show
reckless disregard for the plaintiff's rights, but is not required. Similarly,
both cases also focus on the behavior of the employer rather than Bur-
lington or Faragher standards when deciding whether the employer
should be liable for those punitive damages. The Tenth Circuit has also
been the only circuit to really address these issues since the Kolstad
holding. This leaves much to be determined regarding the range of puni-
tive damage liability.
The Kolstad decision should serve both to resolve the conflict be-
tween the circuits regarding when to award punitive damages and com-
plicate the seemingly uniform method of determining vicarious liability.
The Court finally established that a showing of egregious conduct is not
required for punitive damages, so circuits that have previously required
this heightened standard should no longer do so. Unfortunately, the
Court also confused the requirements for vicarious liability by not de-
fining what constitutes a good faith effort on behalf of the employer.
The Court migrated away from the "tangible employment action" and
"managerial capacity" standards and immediately focused on the em-
ployers knowledge and response to complaints. This analysis will com-
plicate a plaintiffs case because the burden she must meet is unclear.
Employers will find it more beneficial to avoid establishing clear Title
VII policy and training employees about discrimination because the
savvy plaintiff will use this to argue the employer's knowledge of her
legal rights.
Regardless of whether one feels the legislative purpose of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 is to make punitive damages available in only a few
truly exceptional cases, or is to make remedial schemes of civil rights
law more uniform, it is undeniable that the underlying purpose of Title
VII is to deter and prevent discrimination in the workplace. If the courts




make punitive damages almost impossible to win, the remedial scheme
will fail to deter. Indeed, some courts may decide that a "good faith ef-
fort" by the employer means simply not doing anything to enhance or
promote discrimination, rather than truly making an effort to prevent
employees discriminating against and harassing one another, Therefore,
the Kolstad decision is a detriment to civil rights law, even though at first
glance it appears to be establishing a less stringent standard for the
plaintiff.
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